German encounter of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks

Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II, the German armed forces were not aware of two newly developed Soviet tanks, the T-34 and KV. As a result they were surprised when they met them in combat in June 1941. The German's standard anti-tank weapons were found ineffective against these new Soviet tanks. This experience prompted a notable leap in tank development in Nazi Germany, mainly in an effort to counter these new threats.

The Soviets had already deployed a significant number of T-34 tanks,[1] concentrating them into five[2] of their twenty-nine mechanized corps. In these formations T-34 medium tanks were usually accompanied by a third as many KV heavy tanks.

Contents

Initial encounters

At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Germany expected little more of the opponent's forces than the old T-26 and BT tanks. While most of the Soviet Union's tank forces were composed of such tanks, they also surprised the enemy with two new notable designs; the T-34 and KV tanks.[3] Both types were encountered very quickly, on the second day of the invasion – 23 June 1941.[4]

Half a dozen anti-tank gun fire shells at him (T-34) which sound like a drumroll. But he drives staunchly through our line like an impregnable prehistoric monster... It is remarkable that lieutenant Steup's tank made hits on a T-34 once at about 20 meters and four times at 50 meters, with Panzergranate 40 (caliber 5 cm),[nb 1] without any noticeable effect.

— German battle report, Finkel[5]

The KV tanks were usually assigned to the same units as the more numerous T-34, and although they were much larger in size their overall performance was quite similar; many sources discuss impact of both types together. The most used model of KV tank was the KV-1. It was in the Battle of Raseiniai where German forces encountered the Soviet KV tanks for the first time. The Soviet 2nd Tank Division from 3rd Mechanized Corps attacked and overran elements of the German 6th Panzer Division near Skaudvilė on 23 June.[6] German Panzer 35(t) light tanks and antitank weapons were practically ineffective against the Soviet armored giants—some of them were out of ammunition, but closed with and destroyed German antitank guns by literally driving over them.[4][7] An account by the Thuringian 1st Panzer Division describes this battle.

The KV-1 & KV-2, which we first met here, were really something! Our companies opened fire at about 800 yards, but it remained ineffective. We moved closer and closer to the enemy, who for his part continued to approach us unconcerned. Very soon we were facing each other at 50 to 100 yards. A fantastic exchange of fire took place without any visible German success. The Russian tanks continued to advance, and all armour-piercing shells simply bounced off them. Thus we were presently faced with the alarming situation of the Russian tanks driving through the ranks of 1st Panzer Regiment towards our own infantry and our hinterland. Our Panzer Regiment therefore about turned and rumbled back with the KV-1s and KV-2s, roughly in line with them. In the course of that operation we succeeded in immobilizing some of them with special purpose shells at very close range 30 to 60 yards. A counter attack was launched and the Russians were thrown back. A protective front established & defensive fighting continued.

— Paul Carrell, Hitler Moves East[8]

The next day, a single KV heavy tank managed to cut off at a crossroads in front of Raseiniai elements of the 6th Panzer Division which had established bridgeheads on the Dubysa. It stalled the division's advance for a full day while being attacked by a variety of antitank weapons, until it finally ran out of ammunition.[9][10]

Tank versus tank engagements

See also: Mechanized corps (Soviet Union)

Historians initially believed the new tanks were "scattered" among the army in small numbers,[11] but recent scholarship identifies the exact opposite.[12] The new tanks had been produced in large numbers, and concentrated into a dedicated type of formation, mechanized corps.

Selected Soviet mechanized corps on 22 June 1941[12]
Soviet corps Soviet divisions Total Soviet tanks T-34 and KV
6th Mechanized Corps 4th, 7th, 29th 1131 452[nb 2][13]
4th Mechanized Corps 8th, 32nd, 81st 979 414
8th Mechanized Corps 12th, 34th, 7th 899 171
15th Mechanized Corps 10th, 37th, 212th 749 136
3rd Mechanized Corps 2nd, 5th, 84th 672 110
7th Mechanized Corps 14th, 18th, 1st 959 103
16th Mechanized Corps 15th, 39th, 240th 478 76
2nd Mechanized Corps 11th, 16th, 15th 527 60
22nd Mechanized Corps 19th, 41st, 215th 712 31
11th Mechanized Corps 29th, 33rd, 204th 414 20
5th Mechanized Corps 13th, 17th, 109th 1070 17
Total   8590 1590
German disposition of tanks on 22 June 1941[12]
German corps German divisions Total German tanks[14] Tanks with 37 mm cannon
(incl. Panzer 38(t) and Panzer III)		 Tanks with 50 mm or larger cannon
(incl. Panzer III and Panzer IV)
XXXXI Panzer Corps (Germany) 1st, 6th 390 155 121
LVI Panzer Corps (Germany) 8th 212 118 30
XXXIX. Armeekorps mot (Germany) 7th, 20th 494 288 61
LVII Panzer Corps (Germany) 12th, 19th 448 219 60
XXXXVII Panzer Corps (Germany) 17th, 18th 420 99 187
XXXXVI Panzer Corps (Germany) 10th 182 0 125
XXIV Panzer Corps (Germany) 3rd, 4th 392 60 207
III Panzer Corps (Germany) 13th, 14th 296 42 140
XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (Germany) 11th, 16th 289 47 135
XIV Panzer Corps (Germany) 9th 143 11 80
Any other unit of Army Group North, Center, or South[12] 0 0 0
Total   3266 1039 1146[12]

Among the mechanized corps (MC), four formations were especially well equipped; on the day of German invasion, about 70% of the total T-34 and KV tanks produced at that time were deployed in the 6th, 4th, 8th, and 15th MC. The 6th MC operated in Białystok area, and all of the others in the Soviet Ukraine. All of their engagements with German tanks happened during or just before the Battle of Brody (1941):[15]

Tank-to-tank battles were rare at the beginning of operation Barbarossa as Germans did not seek them; they preferred to bypass the Soviet armor when possible. The two standing-out formations, 4th and 6th MC, lost almost all of T-34 and KV tanks during movement, not coming under any German attack.[18][19] Both corps tried to assemble counterattacks against German infantry (not against panzers), but the counterattacks had no impact and were barely noticeable.[20][21] Same pertained to the 15th MC after 26 June.[15]

In the first two weeks of invasion, the Soviet Union suffered the loss of most of its T-34 and KV tanks, as well as the loss of most of the older tanks:

On one hand, these corps had within weeks lost most of their T-34 and KV tanks,[24] but on the other hand, German reports did not note such a massive elimination in combat.[nb 4] The number of non-combat losses was unprecedented.

German anti-tank capability

In the first weeks of invasion, the main German anti-tank weapon was the 3.7 cm Pak 36 gun. The new 5 cm Pak 38 gun had just been entering service in small numbers, with a maximum of two guns per infantry regiment. Both types were practically useless against the T-34.[25]

German tanks of the time used similar types of guns,[nb 5] ineffective against the armor of new Soviet tanks. Generally the T-34 clearly outclassed the existing Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks.[26]

Attempts to destroy the T-34 and KV tanks concentrated on first immobilising them by firing at their tracks and then by tackling them with field artillery, anti-aircraft guns, or by blowing them up at close range by shaped charge grenades.

Impact on tank design worldwide

At the insistence of General Heinz Guderian, a special Panzerkommision arrived on 20 November 1941[27] on the Eastern Front to assess the T-34.[28] To respond to the Soviet tanks, the Germans were forced to adopt new, heavier designs such as the Panther and Tiger, which in turn forced upgrades to the Soviet, United States and British tank fleets. Perhaps more significantly to the ultimate course of the war, the move to more complex and expensive German tank designs overwhelmed the already critically strained German tank-production capability, reducing the numbers of tanks available to German forces and thus helping to force Germany to surrender the initiative in the war to the Allies.

Notes

  1. ^ At the time, the 50 mm Panzergranate 40 mentioned in the report was the most effective anti-armor ammunition in German tank forces.
  2. ^ On June 1 there were 114 KV tanks, 238 T-34 tanks, but another 100 T-34 tanks were received until June 22 1941 (Solonin 2007, pp. 99–100). The number is confirmed in Glantz 2010, p. 37.
  3. ^ The exact proportion of combat to non-combat losses is not known. See Battle of Brody (1941) for description. Solonin, pp. 261–262.
  4. ^ German reports mentioned small-scale encounters with these troublesome, unexpected tank types. They regarded the use of T-34 and KV tanks as "scattered".
  5. ^ 3.7 cm KwK 36 was a turret-mountable version of the standard 3.7 cm Pak 36 infantry gun. The short-barreled 7.5 cm KwK 37 (intended for infantry suppport against fortifications) and the new 5 cm KwK 38 had worse anti-armor capability than the long-barreled towed 5 cm Pak 38.

References

  1. ^ There were 967 T-34 tanks and 508 KV tanks deployed: Erickson 1962/2001, p. 567.
  2. ^ Zaloga 1995, p. 9.
  3. ^ Handel 1989, p. 137
  4. ^ a b Zaloga 1995, pp. 17–21
  5. ^ Finkel 2011, 138-150
  6. ^ Newton 2003, p. 13
  7. ^ Newton, 2003, pp. 21-25
  8. ^ Carrell 1964, pp. 23-24
  9. ^ Zaloga 1995, pp 18–19.
  10. ^ Newton, 2003, p. 33
  11. ^ Stolfi 1993, p. 165
  12. ^ a b c d e Solonin 2007, p. 528–529
  13. ^ Glantz 2010, p. 37
  14. ^ Total German tanks includes non-combat "commander tanks" as well as outdated Panzer I and Panzer II tanks
  15. ^ a b Solonin, p. 379.
  16. ^ Solonin, pp. 310–315.
  17. ^ a b c Solonin, pp. 261–262.
  18. ^ Solonin, p. 321.
  19. ^ Solonin, p. 145.
  20. ^ Solonin, p. 321.
  21. ^ Solonin, p. 145.
  22. ^ Solonin, p. 321.
  23. ^ Solonin, p. 145.
  24. ^ Solonin, pp. 145, 261–262, 321.
  25. ^ Buell et al 2002, pp. 120,147–149
  26. ^ Forczyk 2007, p. 4
  27. ^ Finkel, p. 147.
  28. ^ Doyle & Jentz 1997, p. 4
  • Buell, Thomas B; Bradley, John N; Griess, Thomas E; Dice, Jack W; Bradley, John H (2002). The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. Garden City Park (NY): Square One Publishers. ISBN 0757001602. 
  • Carrell, Paul (1964). Hitler Moves East. Boston: Little, Brown. OCLC 405998. 
  • Doyle, Hilary; Jentz, Tom (1997). Panther Variants 1942-45. London: Osprey. ISBN 9781855324763. 
  • Finkel, Meir (2011). On flexibility: recovery from technological and doctrinal surprise on the battlefield. Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies. ISBN 9780804774895. 
  • Forczyk, Robert (2007). Panther vs T-34 : Ukraine 1943 (1 ed.). Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1846031494. 
  • Glantz, David M. (2010). Barbarossa derailed : the battle for Smolensk, 10 July-10 September 1941. Solihull: Helion. ISBN 1906033722. 
  • Handel, Michael I. (1989). War, strategy, and intelligence (1. publ. ed.). London, England: F. Cass. ISBN 0714633119. 
  • Newton, Steven H (2003). Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front- The Memoirs of General Raus 1941-1945. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81247-9. 
  • Solonin, Mark (2007) (in Polish). 22 czerwca 1941 czyli Jak zaczęła się Wielka Wojna ojczyźniana (1 ed.). Poznań, Poland: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis. ISBN 9788375101300.  (the only English translations of Solonin's works seem to be, as of June 2011, these online chapters)
  • Stolfi, R.H.S (1993). Hitler's panzers east: World War 2 reinterpreted. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0806125810. 
  • Zaloga, Steven; Kinnear, Jim; Sarson, Peter (1995). Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-496-2.